Abstract: This paper tracks the origins and inner changes of Barcelona's economic elite in the long term. The objective is to achieve a deeper understanding of the mechanism that families and individuals developed to gain access to the elites and retain their economic position. For doing so, the paper analyzes industrial and real estate tax payers in three moments (1853-1883-1919). Through this approach we can observe that in aggregate, elites (identified as the 5% of the higher taxpayers) move from a stationary state to a progressive increase of wealth concentration. For a deeper understanding of the mechanism and inner changes of this elite, we focus in 81 families and exhaustively we have tracked down their origin and evolution. The conclusion is that their initial wealth accumulation is linked with a few specific situations. Their economic promotion seems to be related to specific windows of opportunity that open at certain moments and/or places. Once these windows of opportunity close the elites seem to progressively lock on themselves. This tendency created social circles that favored endogamy.
Introduction
The Industrial Revolution in Europe created an economic growth without precedent accompanied by a rise in the internal inequality.
1 In this context some families managed to accumulate fortunes disproportionately big that gave them an enormous political and economic power becoming the new economic elite, whose influence has extended in some cases to the present. 2 The role of the elites in the long term evolution of this inequality has been studied through different approaches. The institutionalists have remarked that the persistence of endowments linked to institutions explain why the inequalities persist, Business History has focused in the particular role of family firms and the Top Incomes approach has studied the share of the rents that the elites manage to retain. 3 However relatively few studies focus in the internal evolution of elites, its evolution in the long term and its permeability. 4 In this sense this paper aims to contribute to this debate analyzing for the case of Barcelona, when 19 th 's Century economic elites were created, replaced and its grade of mobility. The hypothesis that we defend is that the creation of elites is restrained to certain specific moments.
For doing so, we use the taxes on Real State and over Commercial and Industrial activities to map the economic activities of Barcelona in three specific moments: 1853, 1883 and 1919. This mapping of the economic activities of the city and the proprieties allow us to identify the wealthiest 5% objectively. From this pool of individuals we have chosen the twenty five first tax payers for each year and by studying their biographies we have determined for each individual when the individuals gain access to the elites and which activity fostered the change.
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The methodology proposed in this paper has the advantage of identifying objectively who the elites were in three specific moments, instead of relaying in dictionaries of business men or industrialist who can have a bias in their election. 
Concepts and Sources.
In first place we have to take into consideration the concepts used in this paper. When we refer to elites we are talking basically about those individuals situated in the upper 5% of the tax 1 Allen, RC (2009) 2 Some examples would be Carnegie, Rockefeller, Vanderbiltfor the EEUU, Rostchildfor the UK, Schlumberger for Germany, Agnelli for Italy, Juncadella for Spain. 3 Atkinson, AB, Picketty, T (2007) for Top Incomes, for business history see Landes, D (2006) , for institutionalists see Acemoglu, D et al (2008) For a general reflection on the role of billionaires see Delong, B (1998) 4 One of the few debates can be found in England around the "rags to riches" phenomena. See Foreman-Peck, J; Smith, J.A (2004); Nicholas, T (1999) ; Crouzet F(1985) . 5 For studies of Barcelona's elites see Vicencs Vives, J (1954) , Sola, A (1977 Sola, A ( , 1995 Sola, A ( , 2004 and McDonough, G (1986) . For global vision of Spain economic elites: Cabrera, M; Del Rey (2002) and Zurita, R; Camurri, R eds (2008) . 6 For England: Foreman-Peck, J; Smith, J.A (2004); Nicholas, T (1999) ; Crouzet F (1985) . They all use as source dictionaries of industrialists and businessmen. For Spain see Diaz Morala, p (2013) distribution. 7 This is of course a simplification as in the 19 th century society we found very well defined hierarchies depending on richness, kind of capital, how and when was acquired, social prominence, geographical origin with several sides depending on politics and business. 8 With that in mind, in this paper we are referring to the economic elites as a single group as the objective is to understand its evolution.
In this paper we use direct taxes over proprieties (Contribución Territorial henceforth CT) and industrial and commercial activities (Contribución Industrial henceforth CI) as source for mapping the economic activity between 1853 and 1919, pointing objectively the elite's members and tracking its evolution. In this section we analyze the tax system in order to understand the information provided in the sources, its limitations, and how we should use it in our investigation.
In Spain during the period of our study, direct taxes were allocated in an up-down model where the Central Government fixed the quantity that has to be collected. This amount was divided between regions, cities and villages following political criterion. 9 In big cities such as Barcelona, Seville, Valencia and Madrid, the major taxpayers headed commissions that assessed real estate and fixed the CT. This assessment of real estate was made taking into consideration the rents that generated and if this information was not available used the value of the propriety.
For the Commercial activities the Guilds and Associations also represented by the major tax payers made an estimation of the activity of each economic sector and divided the taxes accordingly. Taxes over the manufacturing activities were directly fixed by the Central Administration using a flat rate for each type of machine. Notice that not all the activities were levied being the main excluded ones: bonds, stock shares, and salaries. Finally it is wieldy know that this tax system was subjected to a high degree of tax avoidance and of corruption. 10 In summary during the period studied CI was paid by about 10% of the active population and CT was paid only by 12% of the families. Hence the studied 5% of the upper tax payers represented around 0.6% of population who paid 30-40% of the direct taxes.
There were internal incentives to counterbalance this potential unfairness of this tax system and ensure a certain balance in the allocation of the duties. In the first place, taxes were low and represented a small effort at least for the upper classes. Paying taxes also had individual and collective direct benefices. Only payers were able to acquire the right to vote and to become candidates in municipal and national elections. Also, at least during the first two decades of our study (1850-1860) the quantities that were paid by each of the Guilds and Associations were 7 For a review of different approaches to the elite concept in economy see Brezis E; Temin, P (2007) . 8 Badia, M et al (2010) for an example of networks in Barcelona. 9 Vallejo et al (1996) ; Curto-Grau, M; Herranz-Locan; Solé-Olle (2012) . 10 Is wieldy know that the tax revenue system in Spain was a corrupted one. In 1870 the rural tax avoidance for 1858-1865 was estimated in around 40%. Pons Altes, JM (2008), 9. used to configure the municipal government and the top tax payers were included in the Municipal Government. Taxes were also a way of mapping the wealth as the quantity that each individual or company paid was published. Hence was a way of tracking the relative importance of each other business and therefore a way to credit access. This public exposure also assured a certain level of vigilance between the tax payers. 11 In addition a certain amount of fairness in distribution was also guaranteed by the necessity of political equilibrium. Direct taxes (as the Contribuciones) fall on the activities of the wealthiest, the indirect taxes (Consumos) fall on the poorer. So, the political in charge when allocated the taxes had to consider a balance: If he charged too much in the direct taxes he could lose his positions as he was damaging his electors.
If he charged too much in the indirect taxes he could face an uprising like the one in the neighbour city of Lleida in 1865.
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We conclude that the tax system give us inexact information, but definitely was the mechanism that the major tax payers used to evaluate the incomes of the tax payers and had incentives to be fair. We know the tax system was not proportional to the level of wealth or income, but is possible to use it to identify the elites in an objective way and they give us a general vision (with nuances) of the economic structure of the city.
Commercial and industrial taxes, CI, were divided in four great Tarifas that sub-divide in hundreds of different sections and many of them changed during the period we studied. Massana, C (1985). 191-207. diversification of investment of economic elites that is reflected in their inheritances allows us to overcome this limitation. For instance, Manel Girona was one of the greatest shareholders of the "Banc de Barcelona" a limited company that does not appear, but we can easily find him among the top tax payers for the companies he co-owned or for his real estate proprieties. .
All in all taxes has allowed to construct a date base that can be used to objectively choose who the higher tax payers are in three specific moments, follow the movements of these high taxpayers within the elites and compare the evolution of the different groups that compose the elites.
The elites among the economic structure of Barcelona
In this section we use our data base to present a first aggregate analysis of the economic Secondly, as the top of the pyramid remained stable we observe that the authorities in charge of the revenues, the top tax payers, did an effort for increasing the base of tax payers as year after year we found an increase in the number of divisions and in the diversification of the taxed activities. Of course this also reflects the growth and internationalization of the city and the necessity of the Central Government of gathering taxes.
Thirdly we observe an increase in the differences within the highest tax payers. By way of example observe in graph 3. In it we can see the evolution of the number of merchants and times more than the lowest and the difference between the higher and the lower tax payer has increased to 7.3 times.
This increase in the concentration is also observed among industrial tax payers, as only one tenth of the industry is big enough to be present among the upper 5%. This reflects the evolution of industry in the city since the beginning of the century: very few big factories and many little workshops, which will remain as one of the characteristics of Barcelona's industry during the 20 th century. The increase in this sector is related with a diversification in the activities of the factories. In 1853 we found only different textile activities, but in 1883 we begin to find other activities as manufactories of machinery, nails, cards, beers, etc. Of course we do not have to forget that taxes on industry were fixed by Central Administration as part of the protectionist policy. In consequence we may be facing an underrepresentation of the global weight of these activities. We have to remember that Barcelona was since 1820's both a very important factory core after the industry moved from the interior of Catalonia due to the increase in cost of coal, as well as turning into a "logistic hub" as the city exported a big part of his production to the rest of Spain and the Settlements and imported the raw materials (coal and cotton) need for their industry.
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The distribution of the activities also fits with the information we have from the representation in the City Hall. For instance in 1854-56 manufacturers had 9.5% of the aldermen and paid 10%
of the taxes and merchants had 38% of the representation and paid half of the taxes. This circumstance gives the study more reliability as the propriety is more dispersed.
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As we have previously mentioned in the case of real estate we are able to expand our series to This severe increase in the concentration and in consequence in inequality has to be situated in the middle of city shaken by a mutual violence between the upper classes and the work class. It helps to understand the climate aggression that transformed Barcelona in a violent city by the end of the century.
19 Tafunell, X (1994) , Villar, P (2008 
A prosopographical approach to the elites
The information presented in the previous section maps the distribution of taxes among the different activities and presents an aggregate picture of the evolution of income concentration in Barcelona. In this section we use the same data base to identify the major tax payers tracking their evolution in time.
We have picked up from the 5% 125 top tax payers distributed as follows: the 25 top tax payers The first years after the war was a period of reconstruction of the economic activity heavily conditioned by the war consequences and we only record two cases of economic promotion.
The Canals family, linked with the first factory of calicos and the Bacardi family, merchants that obtained several public procurements (asientos) and that were able to successfully invest in real estate. In both cases branches of those families still were relevant in the 20 th Century. The fact that we are only able to observe two cases reinforces our hypothesis that there was no replacement in the economic elites after the war.
The 18 th century merchants, survivors of the 17 th century, followed a model of commercial business strongly linked with the Ancient Regime logic, were the ultimate objective was to gather enough capital and influence to win access to the aristocracy. But, in the periphery of their supply chains and in the new manufacturing activities we detect the creation of new fortunes with a different mentality.
During the second half of the century due to the reforms carried out by the House of Bourbon (that basically allowed Catalonia and other regions to trade with the colonies without the restrictive laws of the flotas and some incentives to the manufactures and to commerce in general), a loss of influence from the guilds, a very favorable international scenario and a hinterland that produced wine products that could be exchanged, the opportunities boosted, especially for those situated in the right networks. 24 Among them we find the first indianos still linked with the continental colonies of South America, manufacturers of calicos and merchants from the hinterland that were either settling in Barcelona or establishing their first connections with Cuba. A colony that still had not achieved the importance that will have decades later.
Most of these individuals had a (relatively) wealthy background or a solid technical background as part of the guilds that enabled them to take advantage of the opportunities. Although, almost none of them were able to demonstrate that had the rents to become part of the Junta de
Comercio that grouped the main merchants of the city. But when the Napoleonic wars and the Independence of the Colonies hit the city and turned up-down the equilibrium of forces in the commercial sector and industry took a new and leading role being able to take advantage of the situation. If we just compare the surnames of the members of the Junta before and after the war we find that they have changed almost completely.
23 Garcia Espuche, A (2014). 24 Torras i Elias (1994), Vilar P (1964) .
Why? The explanation is linked to the relationship between industry and commerce. Before the war manufacturers depended of merchants. The Junta members controlled the access to the markets and in some ways the access to informal credit. But by the 20's the manufacturers had the most prominent role as they had been able to change their industry and began to manufacture cotton changing the supply lines, the product that was offered and the financial services that the merchants had to offer. 25 This change was already pointed out by Jaume Vicencs Vives and Angels Solà, when they describe how after the Napoleonic Wars a generation of new men took the economic reins of the city. In this paper we have confirmed this affirmation as we can see that a great window of opportunity opened just after 1808 and began Table 3 .origin and period of formation of the elites. 25 Fradera, J (1987) Graph 6. Origin and period of formation of the elites.
Those from the Antilles and specifically Cuba were the most numerous group in 1800-1860 counting 14 individuals. We have to take into consideration that the Antilles was a very particular place during the first decades of the 19 th century. It was one of the places in America with highest GDP and per capita income due to the sugar commerce, whose importance was boosted due to withdraw of Haiti from commerce. 26 Catalonian merchants (and people from all over Spain) participated in different aspects from the triangular commerce that exported wine and manufactures from Catalonia in exchange of sugar from Cuba and cotton form New
Orleans. Strongly linked to the slavery in a time when the United Kingdom banned its commerce.
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The process was gradual and most of them began as part of small business that progressively grew along with the economy of the island. The initial networks were quite small and in fact the most important ones were the ones that linked Barcelona with South America. But after the loss of the colonies and the importance that Cuba acquired both as hub for the cotton and as origin for the sugar this networks increase in importance. The individuals that compose these networks stay in charge for decades sending the benefices to Spain and returning to their hometowns after a time. This immigration remained linked to Catalonia and offered the possibility to young men to jump to the Antilles with a certain security. Newcomers from Catalonia or from other parts of Spain where able to integrate in these established circles and some of them thrive. In return, a apart from the capital, the indianos also returned with an increased human capital.
Indianos had a diverse behavior after their return and their assets, as can see from the last wills that are available tend to diverse in their investments. But in our case studies almost two-thirds appear as important proprietary and the rest where merchants or in two cases factory owners.
26 Coatsworth, J (1999 We have to consider that observing the taxes paid in the city of Barcelona only show part of the picture.
28
Those linked with commerce and manufacturing had a pattern very similar to that found in the second half of the XVIII Century: members of guilds whose activities had a high market value, merchants and manufacturers from the hinterland that moved to the city either as agents of their families or to begin a new business. Examples illustrate these backgrounds. For instance we find the members of the Girona family whose founder Ignasi Girona departed from a wealthy position at the end of the 18th century and was able to create a Merchant House that his sons But commerce as way of boosting solid and long term fortunes very soon reached a dead-end.
Between 1840 and 1900 we only found three cases of economic progress. The family VidalRibas linked with the powerful commercial house of the Nadal whose origins seem to be related with slave trade. And Salvador Andreu, a pharmacist who managed to create a new model of retail business and that managed to direct a huge investment in urbanizing the mountain of Tibidabo and lastly the local agent of the Galician bank house Simeon Garcia. Of course this does not mean that no commercial or financial initiatives were launched. What does it meant is that opportunities either was taken by members of the consolidated elites or that did not generate capital able to survive in the long term.
In reference to industrials, we find families that have their origins in the manufacturing companies created during the 18 th century coming from either technicians related with the calico industry that in most cases finally owned their business, merchants who invested in this sector or foreign technicians. For instance we find a French technician named Jean Achon that through technical improvement was able to establish a calico printing factory whose sons continued.
Francisco Juan Siataré a ship builder from a guild origin that invested the benefits in real estate.
The Batlló a family of manufacturers that just in one generation passed from owning several workshops to one of the largest factories in Barcelona. And the Pons family silk merchants' that invested in a network of factories that lasted for more than one century. During the last decades of the century we observe that the second generation of industrialist that had constructed their factories outside Barcelona moved to downtown either because they favored living in the city or because they invested in the town. And that the new entries are related to factories no longer linked with textile, like Jose Mansana one of the few self-made man that we find which was related with the gas industry, Josep Pujol a bourgeois that in partnership with French industrialists constructed an important brick factory.
In consequence after 1860 the upper part of the elites closed upon themselves, which coincides with the literature of the time. Before the windows of opportunity were linked to specific external shocks. In the review we have identified the War of Succession, the Napoleonic Wars, Table 4 . Members of the elites involved in politics.
Conclusions.
The two approaches presented in this paper give a complementary vision of the evolution of De Riquer, B (2013) reinforced by a progressive concentration of capital. Industry on the other hand, although clearly underrepresented in the tax system had a pyramidal structure with very big factories with high permanence over time and little workshops. The importance of industry as a road to elites seems to become increasingly important during the second half of the century. Other groups appeared as consequence of economic growth and its importance is acknowledged by their incorporation into the tax system but do not generate big accumulations of capital. In this context real estate was for elites another way of investing in both economic and social capital and a way of transferring the capital. The analysis of the long term series of proprieties helps us to understand the inequality associated with the evolution of elites.
We complete this analysis through a prosopographical approach of the principal lineages.
Through a systematic review we find that continuity is also evident, being the movements among the upper 5% common but cases of "rags to riches" very infrequent. The fact that we have been able to track that certain lineages have maintained their presence among the economic elites since the 18 th until today, highlights the importance of studding the initial accumulation of capital.
Biographies also help to obtain information that is clearly unavailable through an aggregate analysis. In the first place we are able to situate the origin of the fortunes and the windows of opportunity. In this we have concluded that the Antilles during the first half of the 19 th century was an exceptional place for promotion either through the effort of generations or by some other ways, whose impact still is matter of controversy. Also, commerce and industry was a way for families very close in an economic sense to elites, to enrich and establish trade houses and factories that would become key actors in the life of the city. But after the decade of 1860's the entries of new members diminish and opportunities seem to be captured by elite's members.
After the impacts of the Napoleonic Wars and the Industrial Revolution it becomes extremely difficult to reach the top, and for those that had already reach it took (generally) decades to step down. The descent from this category could take generations and was generally associated to a dispersion of fortunes among heirs accounting very little cases of bankruptcy. This lack of renewal is reflected in the increasing age of the members of the elite and how they become less interested in a direct involvement in politics. 
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